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 Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge of the United States Court of*.
International Trade, sitting by designation.
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3165
___________
ROBERT LINCOLN, 
Appellant
v.
JOHN A. PALAKOVICH, et. al.; 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-07-cv-01373)
District Judge:  The Honorable Norma L. Shapiro
___________
ARGUED APRIL 13, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,  Judge*
(Filed  June 21, 2010)
___________
J. Nicholas Ranjan, Esq. (Argued)
K&L Gates
210 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellant
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 1.
Harshbarger v. Regan, 599 F.3d 290, 291 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010).  
2
John W. Goldsborough, Esq. (Argued)
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Counsel for Appellees
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Since this opinion is wholly without precedential value, we write solely for the
benefit of the parties, who are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this
matter.  We will vacate the order and remand the cause to the District Court.1
I.
Police arrested Robert Lincoln in 2003 for the robbery and brutal beating of a
woman in her home.  On October 27, 2003, pursuant to a plea agreement, Lincoln pleaded
guilty to charges of attempted murder, robbery, and aggravated assault.  He received a
sentence of sixteen to forty years of imprisonment and twenty years of probation.  
Lincoln’s counsel timely filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court on November 26, 2003.  On January 5, 2004, the Superior Court issued an order
“Whenever a notice of appeal to the Superior Court is filed, the2.
Prothonotary shall send a docketing statement form which shall be completed and
returned within ten (10) days in order that the Court shall be able to more efficiently and
expeditiously administer the scheduling of argument and submission of cases on appeal.
Failure to file a docketing statement may result in dismissal of the appeal.”  Pa. R.A.P.
3517. 
While the discontinuance is recorded on the Superior Court’s docket, there3.
is no reference to the receipt of a praecipe to discontinue.  The record contains a copy of a
praecipe that was signed by Lincoln’s counsel and posted for service by mail to the
District Attorney on January 2, 2004.  We presume, therefore, that the Superior Court
discontinued the matter upon the request of Lincoln’s counsel.  Moreover, the record copy
of the order discontinuing the matter leads us to conclude that it was signed by the
Prothonotary on January 6, 2004, even though it was docketed on January 5, 2004.
The Post Conviction Relief Act is also commonly referenced as “PCRA.” 4.
The letter was filed in accord with Commonwealth v. Finley,  479 A.2d5.
568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). 
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noting Lincoln’s failure to file a docketing statement and requiring him to do so within
ten days.   On that same day, however, the Superior Court discontinued the matter,2
presumably upon the request of Lincoln’s counsel.   3
In February 2004, Lincoln filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post
Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541-9546, claiming ineffectiveness of
trial counsel.   Court-appointed counsel subsequently filed a letter seeking to withdraw4
representation, after reviewing the entire record and concluding that there were not any
substantive or procedural issues of arguable merit.   5
Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County issued a notice of intent to dismiss Lincoln’s
Our order stated the following:  “The foregoing application for a6.
certificate of appealability is granted in part and denied in part.  A certificate of
(continued...)
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petition without a hearing.  Pa. R.Crim. P. 907(1).  Lincoln responded to the notice with a
letter in which he requested an evidentiary hearing and raised, for the first time, an
ineffectiveness claim against his direct-appeal counsel.  The Court of Common Pleas
dismissed the petition and, in a later opinion written for the purposes of appellate review,
it did not address Lincoln’s claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness.
Lincoln appealed pro se to the Superior Court.  The Superior Court dismissed
Lincoln’s claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, concluding that the issue was
waived because it was not raised in Lincoln’s petition for post-conviction relief.  The
Superior Court affirmed the order, finding the claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel
meritless.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur.  
In the District Court, Lincoln’s pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus again
raised the claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel and appellate counsel.  Overruling
Lincoln’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the District
Court held that Lincoln’s claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel was meritless.  The
District Court also concluded that Lincoln’s claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel
was procedurally defaulted, based upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s dismissal of
the claim as waived.  We certified for appeal only Lincoln’s claim of ineffectiveness of
appellate counsel.  6
(...continued)6.
appealability is granted on claim 1 (as numbered in Appellant’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus) concerning whether Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel
when Appellant’s direct appeal was withdrawn.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).  In their briefing, the
parties shall address whether this claim was defaulted by virtue of the fact that Appellant
raised this claim in state court only in his response to the PCRA court’s notice of intent to
dismiss.  We decline to issue a certificate of appealability on claim 2 because jurists of
reason would not debate the District Court’s denial of this claim.  Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.”
  
5
II.
 The principles of finality and comity mandate that a federal habeas court may
not review a state court decision that rests “on a state law ground that is independent of
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”  Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 729 (1991).  In particular, “a state procedural default of any federal claim will
bar federal habeas unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and actual prejudice.”  Id. at
748.  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court also said:  “The terms ‘cause’ and ‘actual
prejudice’ are not rigid concepts; they take their meaning from the principles of comity
and finality discussed above.  In appropriate cases those principles must yield to the
imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.”  Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S.
107, 135 (1982).  The Court expressed confidence that “victims of a fundamental
miscarriage of injustice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard . . . .”  Id.
We are mindful of the District Attorney’s assertion that Lincoln’s present7.
argument in defense of his right to a direct appeal is waived because it is substantially
different from arguments he previously made.  Nonetheless, it has been our long-standing
practice to liberally construe the filings of pro se parties.  United States v. Otero,  502
F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2007).  For this reason, we do not regard Lincoln’s claim as
waived.    
6
Since first raising the issue, Lincoln has consistently asserted that it was his
intent to exercise his right to a direct appeal and that this right was squandered through
his appellate counsel’s deficient performance.   In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Supreme7
Court said the following:
In Cronic, Penson, and Robbins, we held that the complete
denial of counsel during a critical stage of a judicial
proceeding mandates a presumption of prejudice because “the
adversary process itself” has been rendered “presumptively
unreliable.”  Cronic, supra, at 659.  The even more serious
denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself, which a
defendant wanted at the time and to which he had a right,
similarly demands a presumption of prejudice.  Put simply, we
cannot accord any “ ‘presumption of reliability,’ ” Robbins, at
286, to judicial proceedings that never took place.   
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000) (citing United States. v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648 (1984); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000)
(citations to Supreme Court Reporter omitted)).  Applying Flores-Ortega, Lincoln’s claim
of an unfair denial of his right to a direct appeal, if sufficiently supported by evidence,
would constitute a manifest injustice sufficient to grant his petition for writ of habeas
corpus, regardless of any procedural defect.  
7With that said, we find the record bereft of evidence to ground any ruling on the
issue of whether such a manifest injustice has actually occurred.  The record indicates only
that Lincoln’s counsel timely filed an appeal in November 2003, and that, presumably at
the request of Lincoln’s counsel, the Superior Court discontinued the appeal in January
2004.  This, alone, is insufficient to ascertain whether Lincoln’s right to a direct appeal
was prejudiced because we do not know if counsel acted in consultation with Lincoln.  For
this reason, we find that the District Court erred by failing to look beyond the procedural
default issue and consider whether Lincoln could demonstrate prejudice sufficient to grant
his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Accordingly, we will remand the cause to the
District Court for it to consider this issue.  We stress that it remains Lincoln’s burden to
demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure
to consult with him” about the appeal, he would have pursued his direct appeal.  Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484. 
III.
For the above stated reasons, we will vacate the order of the District Court and
remand the cause with instructions to consider whether Lincoln’s right to a direct appeal
was prejudiced by the conduct of his direct-appeal counsel.
